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FOUNDATIONS OF SAND: JUSTICE THOMAS’S CRITIQUE
OF THE INDIAN PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE
Taylor Ledford*
I. Introduction
The federal government of the United States is one of enumerated
powers.1 There appears, however, to be a glaring exception to this rule
when the federal government regulates Indians.2 In this area, Congress
possesses “[p]lenary authority” over tribal affairs,3 an authority not drawn
from the Constitution.4 Since the Supreme Court declared this power to be
“a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department,”5
Congress’s “schizophrenic”6 approach to Indian affairs has been premised
upon the ability “to legislate for the Indian tribes in all matters.”7
At the same time, the Supreme Court has continuously recognized that
“the Indian tribes have not given up their full sovereignty.”8 Despite
Congress passing legislation wholly altering tribal jurisdiction and
governance,9 the Court has recognized that “[t]he sovereignty that the
Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character.”10 This sovereignty
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Every law enacted by
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.”).
2. The terms “Native American,” “American Indian,” “Native,” and “Indian” are often
used interchangeably to refer to the indigenous peoples of the United States. In this
Comment, outside of quotations, I will favor the terms “Native American” or “Native” when
referring to indigenous peoples more generally and the term “Indian” as it is most commonly
used in federal law—that is, referring to members of federally recognized tribes. See, e.g., 25
U.S.C. § 1903(3) (2012) (defining “Indian” for the purposes of the Indian Child Welfare
Act).
3. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
4. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–80 (1886).
5. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565. But see Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430
U.S. 73, 84–85 (1977) (holding that congressional action is within the grant of plenary
power if it “can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation towards
the Indians.” (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974))).
6. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
7. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978).
8. Id. at 323; see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
9. See General Allotment Act (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.); Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), ch. 576, 48
Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended in 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5144).
10. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
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comes not from some delegation by Congress but “existed prior to the
Constitution.”11 It provides tribes jurisdiction “over both their members and
their territory.”12 Paradoxically, this sovereignty is simultaneously inherent,
yet, “subject to complete defeasance” by Congress.13 Like Congress’s
plenary authority, tribes’ inherent sovereignty is not based upon any
language present in the Constitution. Rather, the Court’s definition of
tribes’ inherent sovereignty results from attempts by the Court to reconcile
the position of the United States government as the heir to the colonization
and conquest of North America14 with the fact that tribes remain distinct
political entities exercising aspects of civil and criminal jurisdiction over
their members.15
The Court has analyzed both the plenary authority of Congress and the
retained sovereignty of tribes in recent years, attempting to define the
federal-tribal relationship for the twenty-first century. In Duro v. Reina, the
Court addressed the question of whether inherent tribal sovereignty gives
tribes jurisdiction over non-member Indians.16 Just twelve years earlier, in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court found that while tribes’
inherent sovereignty gave them jurisdiction over tribal members, they had
no jurisdiction over non-Indians, even within the boundaries of their
reservations.17 The Court in Duro, relying on Oliphant and Wheeler, held
that inherent sovereignty no longer provided tribes with jurisdiction over
Indians who were not members of that specific tribe, even on a tribe’s own
land.18
In response to the Court’s holding in Duro, Congress amended the Indian
Civil Rights Act to recognize “the inherent power of Indian tribes . . . to

11. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
12. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557
(1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13. Id.
14. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
15. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 329.
16. 495 U.S. 676, 679, 684–85 (1990).
17. 435 U.S. 191, 211–12 (1978).
18. Duro, 495 U.S. at 691–92. One impact of the decision was that misdemeanors
committed by one Indian in the Indian Country of another tribe became immediately unprosecutable. Aside from enumerated felonies listed at 18 U.S.C. § 1153, federal law
explicitly disclaims jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians against the persons or
property of other Indians in Indian Country. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
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exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”19 In United States v. Lara,
the Court examined whether Congress could use its plenary power to return
elements of inherent tribal sovereignty previously ceded.20 The Court took
this as an opportunity to shore up the text-wanting foundation of the plenary
power doctrine, locating in the Indian Commerce Clause21 and the Treaty
Clause22 the definitive textual source for congressional oversight of tribes.23
Writing for the Court, Justice Stephen Breyer concluded that, to a certain
extent, what Congress taketh away, it can giveth back.24 This interpretation
gave tribes jurisdiction over all federally recognized Indians within Indian
Country25 without implicating restrictions under the federal Bill of Rights.26
The Court in Lara decided that the best path to resolve the tensions
between inherent tribal sovereignty and Congress’s plenary authority was to
pretend as though Congress’s authority was never extra-constitutional.27
Justice Clarence Thomas suggested a different path.28 In his concurrence,
Justice Thomas asserted that “the time has come to reexamine the premises
and logic of our tribal sovereignty cases.”29 Specifically, he rejected the
Court’s holding “that the Constitution grants to Congress plenary power to
calibrate the ‘metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty.’”30 Addressing each
of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the majority in turn, Justice
Thomas noted that the Kagama Court, which itself originated the plenary
power doctrine, “consider[ed] [government reliance on] such a construction
of the Indian Commerce Clause to be ‘very strained.’”31
This Comment addresses Justice Thomas’s critique of the plenary power
doctrine. It will first provide a background of the history and caselaw
surrounding the doctrine. This background will track the drafting of the
19. Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892 (1990) (the “Duro fix”) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2)).
20. 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
23. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.
24. Id.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (defining “Indian Country”).
26. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210; see also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (holding
that the Fifth Amendment, specifically its Grand Jury Clause, had no application in tribal
courts and did not constrain tribal government).
27. Id. at 200.
28. Id. at 214 (Thomas, J., concurring).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 215 (quoting Lara, 541 U.S. at 202).
31. Id. at 224 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1886)).
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Indian Commerce Clause and the establishment of the “domestic dependent
nations” concept. Then, it will address the historical context surrounding
Kagama and Lone Wolf. Finally, it will explore congressional reliance on
plenary power to justify Congress’s various policies that attempt to destroy
or reinvigorate tribal governance over time and the limited standard of
review the Supreme Court affords congressional action taken in accordance
with the plenary power doctrine.
Next, this Comment addresses Justice Thomas’s specific critiques of the
plenary power doctrine. First, it will attempt to evaluate his short critique of
reliance upon the treaty power in Lara. The Comment will then explore his
detailed criticism of reliance on the Indian Commerce Clause to justify
congressional action in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.32 Justice Thomas
contends that the concepts of inherent tribal sovereignty and plenary power
are on a collision course that will lead to either the total destruction or total
vindication of tribal sovereignty.33 This Comment will provide the
alternative views of Professor Gregory Ablavsky, who asserts that a version
of plenary power effectively emanates from the penumbras of the
Constitution.34 His initial premise, as well as the likelihood and effects of
his proposed outcomes, will be evaluated. The Comment concludes that the
total destruction of tribal sovereignty is the more likely result, but it is not
desirable as a policy matter and is not constitutionally required.
Finally, this Comment suggests an alternative analysis for determining
congressional authority over tribes, beyond Congress’s enumerated powers,
that stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Solem v. Bartlett.35 This
approach would require a return to the treatymaking regime and the
Executive duty of recognizing and negotiating with tribal governments, as
any other foreign government, per the Constitution.36 The proper and
constitutional solution for Congress is, as Justice Thomas urges, to “cease[]
treating all Indian tribes as an undifferentiated mass” and instead recognize
that each tribe did or does possess an individual sovereignty limited only to
the extent voluntarily ceded by the individual tribe.37 Such a nuanced rethinking of dual sovereignty principles would be beneficial for tribal,
federal, and even state governments.
32.
33.
34.
(2015).
35.
36.
37.

570 U.S. 637 (2013).
Lara, 541 U.S. at 217–18.
Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1012
465 U.S. 463 (1984).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1968 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss1/5

No. 1]

COMMENTS

171

II. Background
A. Natives at the Framing
The word “Indian” appears only three times in the United States
Constitution. In Section 2 of Article I and Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the word makes appearances only to exclude “Indians not
taxed” from both congressional or tax apportionment, respectively.38 The
word’s sole substantive mention is in the Commerce Clause, which gives
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.”39 This singular
substantive appearance provides little insight into how the Framers intended
their new government to interact with Indian tribes. Nor does the textual
context indicate what the new republic’s citizens would have understood
those words to mean.40
The historical context before the drafting seems to support the notion
that, as with so much of the Constitution, the inclusion of Indian tribes
within the Commerce Clause was an attempt to remedy the problems
inherent in the lack of any clear national-state delineation of jurisdiction
under the Articles of Confederation.41 Under the Articles of Confederation,
Congress confusingly possessed “the sole and exclusive right and power” of
“regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians,” but only so
long as they were “not members of any of the States; provided that the
legislative right of any State, within its own limits, be not infringed or
violated.”42
The result under the Articles was that Congress had exclusive
jurisdiction over Indians outside United States’ borders or within territories
not yet organized into states. States possessed exclusive jurisdiction over
“Member-Indians,” which included those who paid taxes to or were
considered citizens of the state.43 State and national governments
nevertheless effectively shared jurisdiction over non-member Indians
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
40. This is beyond, perhaps, that they intended to give Congress clear authority over all
interstate or international commerce and wanted to leave nothing out.
41. See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce
Clause, 85 DENVER U.L. REV. 201, 231–32 (2007).
42. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, cl. 4. James Madison himself
considered these provisions “obscure and contradictory.” Natelson, supra note 41, at 234
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 219 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001)).
43. Natelson, supra note 41, at 230.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

172

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

within states, because although Congress had “the sole and exclusive right
and power” to regulate affairs of non-member Indians, it could not do so in
any way that “infringed or violated” the legislative right of any state.44
Thus, state legislation could pre-empt national policy. This led to jostling
between state and national governments over which level of government
should manage Indian policy.45 Attempts to narrowly interpret the language
were undermined by the provision’s broad charge and clear drafting history,
which rejected narrower language.46
At the Constitutional Convention, the question of Indian affairs initially
flew below the radar. During its first two months, the Convention left
undecided provisions concerning Indian affairs.47 While the Committee of
Detail, charged with drafting the new Constitution, had been presented with
a plan granting to Congress the “exclusive Power of regulating Indian
Affairs,”48 the first draft the Committee brought to the Convention
contained no provision addressing Indian affairs or commerce.49 After
James Madison suggested an Indian affairs clause containing no exclusivity
language, the Committee returned with language that both narrowed
congressional authority over Indian affairs to “commerce . . . with Indians,
within the [l]imits of any State, not subject to the laws thereof”50 and
followed Madison’s suggestion of using no exclusivity language.51 The
narrowing of the subject matter from “affairs” to “commerce” would have
“den[ied] Congress competence over diplomacy, boundary adjustment, and
other forms of intercourse, all of which would [have been] handled by
treaty instead.”52 The removal of the exclusivity language would have
effectively granted states exclusive jurisdiction over any Indians that they
could subject to their laws,53 while the Treaty Clause would give the federal
government the ability to referee disputes between states and tribes.54

44. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, cl. 4.
45. Natelson, supra note 41, at 235.
46. Id. at 234.
47. Id. at 235.
48. Id. at 236 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 158–
59 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (Committee of Detail)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 237 (quoting THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
48, at 367 (Madison’s Journal) (Aug. 22, 1787)).
51. Id. at 237–38.
52. Id. at 238.
53. Id.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (forbidding states from “enter[ing] into any Treaty”).
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The final draft of the Commerce Clause produced a minimalist
compromise on the Indian question.55 By placing Congress’s grant over
Indian affairs within the Commerce Clause and limiting its language to five
words,56 the final Indian Commerce Clause avoided much of the confusion
that arose under the Articles of Confederation. First, with the removal of the
exclusivity provision, a presumption of state jurisdiction absent affirmative
congressional action replaced the impetus for litigation about where
exclusivity began or ended.57 Similarly, the removal of language limiting
congressional authority to specific classes removed the incentive for
gamesmanship by states to maximize the number of Indians outside federal
authority (and therefore limit the ability of the federal government to
intervene in what might be considered state affairs).58 This culminated in
the view that “states would enjoy concurrent, although subordinate,
jurisdiction with Congress over Indian commerce.”59 If there was any doubt
about the result of conflict between state and federal law, the Supremacy
Clause erased it.60
The new Constitution appeared to create a government of limited
powers, even towards Indians, by limiting Congress’s purview “[t]o
regulate commerce with . . . Indian tribes.”61 The document reserved more
substantive government power to action by treaty, which required alliance
between the Executive and Legislative branches,62 while prohibiting such
action by the states.63
B. The Marshall Trilogy and the Ward-Guardian Relationship
When the Kagama and Lone Wolf Courts pointed to authorities for the
plenary power doctrine, they did not point to provisions of the Constitution,
but instead to Marshall Court decisions.64 Laid out over nine years, the
aptly-named Marshall Trilogy consists of Johnson v. M’Intosh, Cherokee

55. Natelson, supra note 41, at 238.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 238–39.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
64. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564–65 (1903); United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886).
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Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia.65 The trilogy is, among other
things, largely a testament to the ability of the Marshall Court to create just
as many problems as it solved.66
That Johnson itself became the first federal Indian law case was almost
accidental. In Johnson, the question presented to the Court was limited in
scope, addressing only whether a private purchase of Indian land, made in
violation of the Proclamation of 1763, would have been recognized in
British courts in 1773.67 Further, if so, would United States courts be bound
to recognize it in 1823?68 Chief Justice Marshall, seeking to validate land
claims Virginia awarded its militia veterans,69 expanded and flipped the
question so the Court could rule definitively on who could purchase Indian
lands.70 By lifting his historical analysis of discovery and conquest from his
own critically-panned biography of George Washington71 and tailoring his
legal analysis to his desired outcome, Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed the
discovery doctrine.72 Under this doctrine, when European powers
‘discovered’ territory in the new world, fee simple title to the land
immediately vested in the discovering sovereign.73 Indian tribes retained
solely an occupancy right, which could only be relinquished to the
discovering sovereign or its successor in interest.74
Eight years later, when Cherokee Nation advocates confronted the Court
with the results of Johnson, the Court opted not to directly address the
question of what authority states possess over Indians within their borders.75
The advocates in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, having brought their suit
under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction,76 should be forgiven for
believing that they had forced the issue.77 Instead, the Marshall Court held
65. See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
66. See generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, Chief Justice John Marshall and the Doctrine
of Discovery: Friend or Foe to the Indians?, 42 TULSA L. REV. 125 (2006).
67. LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA
DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 96–97 (2005).
68. Id. at 96.
69. Id.
70. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591–93.
71. ROBERTSON, supra note 67, at 101–02.
72. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572–73.
73. Id. at 572–74.
74. Id.
75. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
76. Id. at 15–16.
77. See generally U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (defining the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of the United States).
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that because Cherokee Nation was neither a foreign nation nor a state of the
United States, the Court had no authority to hear the case under its original
jurisdiction.78 Rather, the Court noted that the status of Indian nations
within the United States is one of a “domestic dependent nation[],” a
relationship that “resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”79
The Cherokee Nation Court’s explanation of this ward-guardian
relationship contains some of the most paternalistic language in Supreme
Court Indian caselaw. Under this relationship, Indian tribes turn to the
federal government “for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power;
appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great
father.”80 At the same time, the Court in Cherokee Nation began to
recognize the founding tenants81 of what would later be defined as “inherent
tribal sovereignty.”82 The Court recognized that Indian tribes, or at very
least the Cherokee, are “distinct political societ[ies], separated from others,
capable of managing [their] own affairs and governing [themselves].”83
Indeed, the Court noted that the Cherokee, in particular, “have been
uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our country.”84
The Court’s avoidance of this issue did not last. In Worcester v. Georgia
just one year later, Chief Justice Marshall got the chance to fix the problems
created in Johnson without the procedural pitfalls of Cherokee Nation.85 In
Worcester, a white non-Indian living within Cherokee Nation territory was
arrested, tried, and convicted by the State of Georgia for the high crime of
“‘residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation without a license,’ and
‘without having taken the oath to support and defend the constitution and
laws of the [S]tate of Georgia.’”86 Marshall used Worcester to attempt to
undo as much of Johnson as possible without explicitly overturning it.
Chief Justice Marshall began Worcester by providing an alternative
account of discovery and colonization from the one he proffered in
Johnson, premising the new account on “the actual state of things.”87 This
alternative history, while not explicitly rejecting the discovery doctrine
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20.
Id. at 17.
Id. This is especially ironic given that Andrew Jackson was President in 1831.
Id. at 16.
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978).
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
Id.
See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
Id. at 543.
Id. at 542–44.
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wholesale, attempts to reformulate the concept from the Court’s declaration
in Johnson that Indian tribes’ “power to dispose of the soil at their own
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.”88
Instead, the history in Worcester pointed to a conclusion that discovery
“gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did not found that right on a
denial of the right of the possessor to sell.”89 The Court based this
seemingly opposite conclusion on its conceptualization of discovery as a
contractual arrangement among European powers, one that did not directly
implicate the rights of tribes.90
The Court concluded in Worcester by detailing, for the first time, the
nature of tribal sovereignty,91 expanding upon the foundations laid down in
Cherokee Nation92 and holding that the laws of the State of Georgia “can
have no force” within the boundaries of the Cherokee Nation.93 This
affirmed Cherokee Nation’s inherent authority to exclude any nonmembers, except to the extent required by treaties or federal statute.94 “The
Indian nations,” the Court declared, “had always been considered as
distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.”95
As long as this “full right to the land[] they occupied” had not been
extinguished by the federal government acting with tribal consent, “within
[tribal] boundary, they possessed rights with which no state could
interfere.”96

88. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
89. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544.
90. Id. (“[Discovery] was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition
among those [European nations] who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the
previous rights of those who had not agreed to it.”). Chief Justice Marshall even went so far
as to declare that “[t]he extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble [British] settlements
made on the sea coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate
power by them to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea to sea, did not enter the
mind of any man.” Id. at 544–45 (emphasis added). This seems a far cry from Johnson’s
summation “that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.” 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at
574.
91. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
92. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16–17 (1831).
93. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 559.
96. Id. at 560.
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C. United States v. Kagama and the Advent of Plenary Power
In order to understand the historical circumstances surrounding the
Court’s discovery of extra-constitutional power in Kagama,97 it is crucial to
address the Court’s decision in Ex parte Crow Dog98 and the Major Crimes
Act of 1885.99 In Crow Dog, a federal jury in the Dakota Territory
convicted Crow Dog, a Sioux Nation tribal member, for the murder of
Spotted Tail, another Sioux Nation tribal member.100 While the murder
occurred squarely within the outer boundaries of the Dakota Territory, it
also plainly occurred within Indian Country.101 Thus, Crow Dog appealed
his conviction on the grounds that federal criminal jurisdiction did not
extend to crimes committed by Indians against Indians of the same tribe
occurring within Indian Country.102 The Supreme Court agreed, holding
that while federal criminal jurisdiction had been extended to certain classes
of crimes committed within Sioux Nation under an 1868 treaty, the
language of the treaty did not cover Indian-on-Indian crimes occurring
therein.103 The Court noted that to hold otherwise, in the absence of clear
congressional intent, would “impose upon [Indians] the restraints of an
external and unknown code . . . according to rules and penalties of which
they could have no previous warning.”104
In 1885, Congress responded to Crow Dog by passing the Major Crimes
Act (MCA).105 The MCA expressly extended concurrent federal criminal
jurisdiction to an enumerated list of crimes occurring in Indian Country so
long as the crime was committed by a tribal member.106 Between 1883 and
1885, no new treaties were signed with Sioux Nation.107 Therefore, because
the Crow Dog Court already held that the 1868 treaty did not extend to
Indian-on-Indian crimes occurring in Indian Country,108 the question the
Court would have to address in United States v. Kagama was: Under what
97. See generally United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
98. See generally 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
99. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (originally enacted as Act of
Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385).
100. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 571–72.
104. Id. at 571.
105. See Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (Major Crimes Act)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153).
106. Id.
107. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 567–68.
108. Id.
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provision of the United States Constitution is Congress empowered to
regulate the internal criminal affairs of tribes?109
The proper test case appeared the next year when two Indians,
Mahawaha and Kagama, were charged with the murder of another Indian,
Iyouse, within the Hoopa Valley Reservation in California.110 In Kagama,
the Court reviewed essentially two questions certified to it: 1) was the MCA
within the constitutional power of Congress to pass; and if it was, 2) did
federal courts have jurisdiction to try Indian-on-Indian crimes occurring
within a reservation?111 The Court quickly dispensed with the second
question because, unlike in Crow Dog, the MCA clearly placed enumerated
Indian-on-Indian offenses occurring in Indian Country within federal
jurisdiction, regardless of whether it occurred on or off reservation.112
The United States government presented two sources of congressional
authority for the passage of the MCA: 1) the Indian Commerce Clause, and
2) the treaty power.113 The Court rejected both arguments.114 First, it held
that it would be “a very strained construction” of the Indian Commerce
Clause that would empower Congress to create “a system of criminal laws”
within an act that did not contain even a tangential reference to
commerce.115 Likewise, the Court rejected the notion that Indian tribes fell
within Congress’s grant of authority over affairs with foreign nations.116 If
Indian tribes were foreign nations, the Court reasoned, there would have
been no reason to include them within the Commerce Clause at all, as it
already explicitly covered foreign nations.117 The Court went even further,
holding that Indian tribes were not “nations” within the meaning of the

109. 118 U.S. 375, 376 (1886).
110. Id. The procedural posture of Kagama proves it was a test case; the Court heard the
case based solely upon a demurrer to the evidence prior to any actual conviction. Id. at 375.
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s factual accounting does little justice to that actual story,
failing to identify, among other things, the tribe to which the parties belonged (Yurok), and
that Kagama and Mahawaha were father and son. For a fuller accounting of the background,
see Sindey L. Herring, The Story of United States v. Kagama, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 149,
152–53 (Carole Goldberg, Kevin K. Washburn, & Philip P. Frickey eds., 2011).
111. Id. at 376.
112. Id. at 377–78.
113. Id. at 378–79.
114. Id. at 378–80.
115. Id. at 378.
116. Id. at 378–79.
117. Id. at 379.
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Constitution. The word “nation,” despite numerous appearances throughout
the Constitution, does not ever appear to reference Indian tribes.118
Despite finding no words in the Constitution to support the government’s
assertion of congressional authority, the Court ultimately found the MCA to
be a valid exercise of federal power that “must exist in that government,
because it never has existed anywhere else.”119 The Court began by drawing
an analogy between the state of Indian tribes and federal territories,
divorcing the source of federal power to make and enforce laws in its
territories120 from the words of the Constitution that would seem to provide
such authority.121 Instead, the Court reasoned that “this power of
Congress . . . arises, not so much from the clause in the Constitution[,] . . .
as from . . . the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the
National Government, and can be found nowhere else.”122
The Court held that, due to the unique status of Indian tribes, general
criminal laws must be “within the competency of Congress.”123 As “wards
of the nation,” Indian tribes “depend[] on the United States . . . for their
daily food . . . [and] political rights.”124 Since the course of dealing with the
federal government had left Indian tribes weak and helpless, the federal
government had assumed a “duty of protection, and with it the power.”125
This power “over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and
diminished in numbers” exists for “their protection, as well as to the safety
of those among whom they dwell.”126 In order to protect Indian tribes from
states whose people “are often their deadliest enemies,” the Court held that
this power must exist in the federal government.127 Therefore, the Major
Crimes Act was a valid exercise of that power.128

118. Id. (“Were they nations, in the minds of the framers of the Constitution? If so, the
natural phrase would have been ‘foreign nations and Indian nations,’ or . . . it would
naturally have been ‘foreign and Indian nations.’”).
119. Id. at 384.
120. Id. at 380.
121. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States.”).
122. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 380.
123. Id. at 383.
124. Id. at 383–84.
125. Id. at 384.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 385.
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D. Lone Wolf and the Exercise of Pax-Plenary Power
1. Allotment Era
While it was clear after Kagama that Congress could assert complete
criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country, the Court did not describe the full
extent of that power until 1903.129 In the immediate aftermath of Kagama,
Congress flexed its newly text-liberated power over Indian affairs through
the passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887 (also known as the
Dawes Act).130 The Dawes Act represented a titanic policy shift from one
that favored effective segregation by reservation to one that favored
assimilation through the allotment of reservation land.131 Under the Dawes
Act, the President was authorized to divide up reservation land and grant a
fixed sum of land (an allotment) to each tribal member.132 The allotment
land itself would be selected by the recipient or his guardian (or the
Secretary of the Interior if no selection was made within four years) and
would be held in trust for the sole use and benefit of the individual allottee
for twenty-five years.133 After this period, the allottee, now presumably
“assimilate[d] to agriculture, to Christianity, and to citizenship,” would
receive a patent in fee simple for the land and would become subject to
state civil and criminal jurisdiction.134
For this assimilation plan to actually work, Congress reasoned, there
must be a dominant culture on hand into which the newly individualized
Indians could assimilate.135 The Dawes Act served this function by
providing for the opening of the “surplus” lands for non-Indian settlement,
at the President’s discretion, after all allotments had been assigned. 136
Unlike allotment itself, the opening of surplus lands would seem to require
tribal consent under the Act.137 Section 5 of the Dawes Act instructed the
“Secretary of the Interior to negotiate with such Indian tribe for the
129. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903).
130. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (repealed 2000).
131. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1995).
132. Dawes Act § 1, 24 Stat. at 388. Initially the statute provided different sums based
upon the status of a tribal member. See id. By 1891, however, the statute had been amended
to provide an equally sized allotment to each tribal member. Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383,
§ 1, 26 Stat. 794, 794; see also Royster, supra note 131, at 10 n.34 (summarizing
congressional changes to standard allotment sizes between 1887 and 1910).
133. Dawes Act §§ 2, 5, 24 Stat. at 388, 389–90.
134. Royster, supra note 131, at 10; Dawes Act § 6, 24 Stat. at 390.
135. Royster, supra note 131, at 13.
136. Dawes Act § 5, 24 Stat. 389–90.
137. Id.
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purchase and release . . . of such portions of its reservation not allotted as
such tribe shall, from time to time, consent to sell.”138 Even if tribes and
commissioners agreed to the contents of an agreement, the agreement still
required passage of a congressional act to become binding.139 While some
agreements were successfully negotiated, many tribes refused to sell or
asked too high a price.140 It is against this backdrop that the Supreme Court
decided what has since been called the Dred Scott v. Sandford141 of Indian
law: Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.142
2. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock
In 1892, at the height of allotment, commissioners representing the
United States were sent to negotiate the allotment of a reservation
belonging jointly to the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache tribes.143 In
ostensible compliance with the “Medicine Lodge Treaty,” which required
the signatures of three-fourths of all adult male tribal members before
cession of any part of the reservation, the commissioners collected the
signatures of 456 adult male Indians.144 The Indian Agent certified that
there were only 562 adult male Indians within the three tribes, placing the
number of signatures squarely above the three-fourths requirement.145
Under the agreement, the tribes would surrender their land rights to the
United States.146 The federal government would then allot the standard
amount of land to individual Indians to be held in trust by the United States
and taken in fee simple by the allottee or their heirs after twenty-five years.
In accordance with the agreement, the tribes would receive $2,000,000 as
consideration for the 2,150,000 acres of arable surplus land.147 Specially
provided for were the “sundry named friends of the Indians,” which
included the Indian Agent and an Army officer, who received land benefits
as if they were members of the tribe.148

138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Id.
140. Royster, supra note 131, at 13.
141. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
142. Joseph William Singer, Lone Wolf, or How to Take Property by Calling It a “Mere
Change in the Form of Investment,” 38 TULSA L. REV. 37, 37 (2002).
143. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 554–55 (1903).
144. Id. at 554.
145. Id. at 554–55.
146. Id. at 555.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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As it happened, the Indian Agent’s count of total adult male Indians was
incorrect.149 After the agreement was submitted to Congress, representatives
of the tribes immediately objected that the commissioners obtained the
signatures as a result of their interpreters’ fraudulent misrepresentations and
that three-fourths of the adult male members had not signed.150 While the
House of Representatives passed the bill without comment, the Senate
requested that the Secretary of the Interior certify that the signatures
attached to the agreement constituted three-fourths of the male adult tribal
membership when the agreement was signed.151 The Secretary reported that
no 1892 census records existed, but 1893 records indicated that there were
725 men over the age of eighteen, with 639 over the age of twenty-one.152
Under either measure, the Secretary admitted, “less than three fourths of the
male adults appear[ed] to have so signed.”153
Congress amended the agreement to provide 480,000 acres of grazing
land to be held in common by the tribes and eliminated the special benefits
for the Indian Agent and Army officer.154 Nevertheless, the tribes’
representatives did not consent, and on June 6, 1900, Congress passed the
bulk of the agreement over their objections and without any further attempt
to gather signatures.155 Shortly thereafter, Lone Wolf, Principal Chief of the
Kiowa Tribe, brought suit, alleging a violation of the Medicine Lodge
Treaty, among other improprieties in the agreement process.156 The
Supreme Court granted review to determine whether Congress acted
improperly by failing to gather the signatures of three-fourths of the adult
male tribal members in violation of the Medicine Lodge Treaty.157 The
Court held that it had not.158
The Court took this opportunity to declare that not only was
congressional authority over Indian affairs extra-constitutional, but that it

149. Id. at 557.
150. Id. at 556.
151. Id. at 557.
152. Id.
153. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Id. at 559–60.
155. Id. at 559–61. Congress passed additional amendments shortly thereafter to extend
the time for allotting the land and to facilitate the opening of surplus land for white
settlement, likewise without any attempt to comply with the Medicine Lodge Treaty. Id. at
560–61.
156. Id. at 560–61, 564.
157. Id. at 564.
158. Id.
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was plenary in nature.159 This power, the Court explained, had “always
been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial
department of the government.”160 The Court offered three justifications for
its expansive view of this power. First, the Court noted the status of Indian
tribes and their “relation of dependency.”161 Second, the Court reasoned that
plenary authority is necessary, at least in the context of land, due to the
United States’ ownership of the underlying title.162 Third, the Court argued
that the federal government is the proper entity to trust with this sort of
authority.163
The status of Indian tribes is crucial, the Court stated, because allowing
the Medicine Lodge Treaty to limit the authority of Congress would have
fundamentally altered the relationship between tribes and the federal
government.164 Congress could not fully care for and protect Indian tribes if
it could not quickly, and without tribal assent, “partition and dispos[e] of”
Indian lands.165 As Indian tribes remain dependent on the federal
government, the Court contended, the government’s unencumbered ability
to protect them remains paramount.166 In order to quickly respond to any
possible emergency, the Court concluded that Congress needed the ability
to unilaterally abrogate treaties.167
Next, the Court turned to the nature of the lands at issue and the federal
government’s relationship to them.168 The Court first distinguished prior
caselaw that seemed to place the territorial integrity of Indian tribes’
reservations in a place of special concern.169 The Court cited to Johnson,
Cherokee Nation, and Worcester, characterizing them as standing for the
proposition that the Indian right of occupancy might be “as sacred as the fee
of the United States in the same lands.”170 These cases are inapplicable, the
Court said, because they involved a dispute between either an Indian tribe
and a state or an individual, not a dispute between the federal government

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 565.
Id.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 565–66.
Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. at 564–65.
Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. at 564–65.
Id.
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and a tribe.171 The Court made clear that when an Indian tribe’s interest in
occupancy is measured directly against the United States’ interest in the
underlying fee, the interest of the United States is greater.172 This interest,
which Congress may transfer at any time, brings with it “a paramount
power over the property of the Indians, by reason of [the United States’]
exercise of guardianship.”173 This authority, the Court held, may “be
implied, even though opposed to the strict letter of a treaty with the
Indians.”174
Finally, the Court contended that the very nature of this extraconstitutional power makes judicial review unnecessary and imbues a per se
presumption of good faith on congressional action.175 The Court asserted,
without providing any sources or examples, that this “[p]lenary authority
over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from
the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not
subject to be controlled by the judicial department.”176 The Court doubled
down on some of its prior rhetoric from Beecher v. Wetherby,177 holding
that when Congress exercises this power, “[i]t is to be presumed that in this
matter the United States would be governed by such considerations of
justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant
and dependent race.”178 This presumption is proper, according to the Court,
because even before Congress ended the practice of dealing with Indian
tribes through treaties in 1871, “a moral obligation rested upon Congress to
act in good faith in performing the stipulations entered into on its behalf.”179
The Court created no outer limit to this new congressional power to
abrogate provisions of treaties with Indians but instead merely expressed a
hope that “such power will be exercised only when circumstances arise
which . . . may demand, in the interest of the country and the Indians
themselves, that it should do so.”180 The Court concluded, however, by
unequivocally indicating that it would not enforce this hope, but would
“presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the dealings with the
171. Id.
172. Id. at 565–66.
173. Id. at 565.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 566.
176. Id. at 565.
177. 95 U.S. 517 (1877).
178. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565 (quoting Beecher, 95 U.S. at 525) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
179. Id. at 565–66.
180. Id. at 566.
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Indians.”181 If tribes wished to call foul on congressional action, the Court
mandated that “relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress,
and not to the courts.”182 Taking the position that “the judiciary cannot
question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of this
legislation,” the Court held that the June 6, 1900, Act and its subsequent,
related acts were constitutionally valid.183 To the extent they conflicted with
provisions of the Medicine Lodge Treaty, they abrogated those portions of
the Treaty.184
3. After Lone Wolf
In the years after Lone Wolf, Congress’s allotment policy kicked into
high gear. From the passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887 to 1900,
Congress created only “55,996 allotments, covering 6,736,504 acres”; by
1910, there were “190,401 allotments[,] covering 31,093,647 acres.”185
Whereas tribal consent appeared important, if not vital, before Lone Wolf,
all pretense was dropped with the judicial declaration of plenary power. For
example, when Commissioner of Indian Affairs William A. Jones testified
before the House Committee on Indian Affairs in 1904 concerning the
setting of a per-acre purchase price for surplus lands on the Rosebud
Reservation, he emphatically urged the Committee to act without seeking
tribal consent.186 Jones made the ward-guardian analogy literal, comparing
the Native residents of the Rosebud Reservation to “child[ren] [of] 8 or 10
years of age.”187 Jones asked rhetorically if the Committee would “ask the
consent of [a] child as to the investment of its fund?”188 Over the protest of
Indian advocates, Congress passed the measure without consultation with,
let alone the consent of, the tribes.189 The Committee’s only justification for

181. Id. at 568.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. The comparisons to Dred Scott began almost immediately. See, e.g., 36 CONG.
REC. 2028 (1903) (statement of Sen. Matthew Quay) (“It is the Dredd Scott decision No. 2,
except that in this case the victim is red instead of black. It practically inculcates the doctrine
that the red man has no rights which the white man is bound to respect, and that no treaty or
contract made with him is bind. Is not that about it?”).
185. 2 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 865 (1984).
186. Id. at 868.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 869.
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altering the course of its dealing was the one offered to it by the Court:
whenever Congress acted, it did so in the best interests of the Indians.190
This pattern of congressional action without any serious tribal
consultation or consent, justified as being in the tribe’s best interest,
continued.191 Congressional acts concerning tribal lands “were proposed by
western politicians, approved by a voice vote in Congress, and greeted with
cheers from local settlers and businessmen.”192 During this time, the federal
government attempted to regulate nearly every aspect of life on Indian
reservations in a continuing attempt to Christianize and civilize.193
For example, the Office of Indian Affairs regulated not only liquor
consumption on reservations, but also intimately regulated tribal religious
ceremonies, carefully monitoring dances that may involve “acts of selftorture, immoral relations between the sexes, the sacrificial destruction of
clothing or other useful articles, the reckless giving away of property, the
use of injurious drugs or intoxicants, and frequent or prolonged periods of
celebration.”194 Traditional Native religious or cultural ceremonies that
involved these practices were classified as “[I]ndian offenses” and
prohibited by law.195
When current Supreme Court precedent would seem to limit the
population within the federal government’s jurisdiction, the Court changed
the law. The Pueblos of New Mexico and Arizona, for example, had long
been considered legally distinct from Native communities elsewhere in the
United States by virtue of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo under which the
United States acquired the territory.196 The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
guaranteed that those who suddenly found themselves residents of the
United States due to the Treaty could “retain[] the property which they
[had] possess[ed] in the said territories,” or, if they wished, sell their
property and expatriate the profits unencumbered.197 Under the laws of
Mexico, and Spain before it, Pueblo Indians retained fee title to their lands,

190. Id.
191. Royster, supra note 131, at 14.
192. Id. (quoting FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE
THE INDIANS, 1880–1920, at 165 (1984)).
193. PRUCHA, supra note 185, at 764–66.
194. Id. at 801 (quoting Office of Indian Affairs Circular no. 1665 (Apr. 26, 1921)
(M1121, reel 12)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Id.
196. United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 618 (1876).
197. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico,
Mex.-U.S., art. 8, July 4, 1848, 9 Stat. 922.
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not “Indian title” in the spirit of Johnson.198 As a result, Pueblo title was as
freely alienable as land owned by non-Indians in the United States.199
More than that, Pueblo were not initially considered “Indians” in the
legal sense.200 Noting the cultural differences between Pueblo Indians and
Native peoples elsewhere within the United States, as well as their more
assimilated status (having adopted both the Spanish language and
Catholicism), the Court held in United States v. Joseph that Pueblo Indians
were “Indians only in feature, complexion, and a few of their habits; in all
other respects superior to all but a few of the civilized Indian tribes of the
country, and the equal of the most civilized.”201 Thus, the Court reasoned,
Pueblos were neither Indians in the traditional sense, nor were they
intended to be covered by the use of the term in the relevant 1834 statute.202
When Congress attempted to exercise its plenary power to prohibit the
introduction of alcohol to Pueblos, it appeared that things had changed.203
In United States v. Sandoval, the Court reviewed the legality of a criminal
prosecution for selling liquor to the Santa Clara Pueblo.204 Federal law
prohibited the introduction of liquor and other intoxicating beverages to
Indian Country.205 New Mexico’s Enabling Act mirrored the federal
prohibition and deemed Pueblo lands to be Indian Country within the
meaning of federal law.206 The question for the Court, then, was “whether
the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands” placed them within the
scope of Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs.207 Based upon
reports from Indian agents, the Supreme Court determined that due to the
Pueblo’s “degraded condition” and subsequent acts of Congress regulating
them, Pueblos were now ‘Indians’ that Congress had plenary power to
regulate.208

198. Joseph, 94 U.S. at 618.
199. Id. at 618–19; see also United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913).
200. Joseph, 94 U.S. at 617–18.
201. Id. at 616–17.
202. Id. at 617.
203. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 38–39.
204. Id. at 36.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 36–37.
207. Id. at 38. Interestingly enough, the Court held that New Mexico’s statehood act did
not resolve the question, because although Congress may determine whether tribal groups
are “distinctly Indian communities,” it may not arbitrarily determine if they are racially
“Indian.” Id. at 46.
208. Id. at 45, 46–48.
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4. The Indian Reorganization Act
Part of the attractiveness of plenary power is that when in the proper
hands, its exercise is capable of accomplishing just as much good as ill. For
example, in the aftermath of the Meriam Report’s scathing review of the
Allotment Era Office of Indian Affairs,209 with new leadership in the
Interior Department and the New Deal Congress in full swing, Congress
passed the Indian Reorganization Act (the IRA).210 The sweeping
legislation officially ended the policy of allotment, prohibiting further
allotments, extending trust periods on allotted land with existing Indian title
indefinitely, maintaining restrictions on the alienability of Indian lands,
barring the transfer of restricted lands except to tribes, and limiting their
ability to be devised.211 The IRA allowed tribes to organize and adopt
constitutions to further self-government and permitted tribes to incorporate
for the purpose of business endeavors.212 The IRA allowed tribes to devise
their own constitutions while also providing a model constitution tribes
could adopt.213 Although officially most of its provisions were optional to
tribes, there was an opt-out process for the IRA that required tribes to
affirmatively opt-out by a majority vote of the tribe’s members.214
The IRA went much further than simply attempting to right prior wrongs
through reinstating meaningful tribal self-government; it also sought to
restore tribal control over land long since removed through allotment.215 In
particular, section 5 of the IRA authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
take land into trust for the benefit of tribes, “restore remaining surplus lands
to tribes,” create new reservation lands, or extend existing ones.216 This
effectively allowed the Secretary to unilaterally grant tribal sovereignty
over any lands within the United States, taking what before 1871 required a
treaty signed by the President and agreed upon by two-thirds of the United
States Senate, and turning it into a purely administrative function.

209. PRUCHA, supra note 185, at 810 (the report found “deplorable conditions in health,
education, and economic welfare and found incompetent and inefficient personnel”).
210. Id. at 957–63.
211. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.05 at 82 (Neil Jessup Newton et
al. eds., 2012).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 83 n.16.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 82.
216. Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 5108 (2012).
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E. Review of Congressional Action
Although the Supreme Court stated in Lone Wolf that Congress’s Indian
power was “a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial
department,”217 the Court has since backed away from a total bar on judicial
review. Beginning in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, a plurality
of the Court explicitly recognized that “[t]he power of Congress over Indian
affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it is not absolute.”218 There, although
the Court did not invalidate congressional action per se, it rejected the
federal government’s interpretation of the Act of 1935.219 The government’s
interpretation would have allowed it to legitimize its prior taking of tribal
lands “without rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just
compensation for them,” in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause.220
Likewise, in Morton v. Mancari, the Court reviewed a challenge to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs’ preferential hiring policy (under provisions of the
IRA) towards tribal members on the grounds that it constituted racial
discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.221 Even as the Court acknowledged that the challenger’s
theory would effectively eliminate federal Indian policy, it did not reject the
challenge out of hand.222 Instead, the Court went on to seriously consider
the claims presented, ultimately deciding that the classification itself was
not a racial preference at all, but a political one that turned on whether the
applicant was a member of a federally recognized tribe.223
The only Supreme Court case to squarely address, in the modern context,
the standard of review for whether Indian affairs related legislation properly
falls within Congress’s ambit occurred a few years later in Delaware Tribal

217. 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
218. 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946) (plurality opinion).
219. Id.; see also Act of Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 686, 49 Stat. 801, 801–02 (giving the United
States Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear claims of certain tribes residing in Oregon).
220. Alcea Band, 329 U.S. at 54 (quoting United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103,
110 (1935) (internal quotations omitted)).
221. 417 U.S. 535, 537 (1974).
222. Id. at 552 (“If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly
designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of
the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment
of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.”).
223. Id. at 553–54. It might be noted that the BIA’s policy also required applicants “be
one-fourth or more degree Indian blood,” a facet of the policy the Court did not address
directly. Id. at 553 n.24 (quoting 44 BIAM 335, 3.1).
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Business Committee v. Weeks.224 There, the Court reviewed a challenge to
the federal government’s award distribution scheme following an Indian
Claims Commission decision to compensate for a breach of an 1854 treaty
with the Delaware Tribe.225 In Weeks, the government argued that
“congressional exercise of control over tribal property is final and not
subject to judicial scrutiny.”226 The Court, citing Alcea Band and Mancari,
rejected the notion of a categorical bar on review.227 Instead, the Court held
that review was proper but limited the standard to whether “the special
treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’[s] unique
obligation toward the Indians.”228 Under this permissive standard of review,
the Court upheld Congress’s choice to exclude the Kansas Delaware from
the award because they had split off from the main Delaware Tribe and
accepted United States citizenship—even though they did so after the
breach of the treaty.229
Even on the sparing occasions when the Court has struck down Indian
affairs related legislation, it has not done so because it was an improper use
of plenary power, but rather because it violated some other constitutional
provision. For example, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court
invalidated a portion of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which
abrogated state sovereign immunity in order to enforce a good-faith
negotiating duty with tribes.230 It did not invalidate the provision because its
regulation of state behavior could not “be tied rationally to the fulfillment
of Congress’[s] unique obligation toward the Indians”231—in fact, the Court
did not review it under this standard at all. Rather, the Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment barred the federal government from abrogating state
sovereign immunity, save for action under the Fourteenth Amendment.232
What was facially a case about Congress’s Indian affairs power contained
no actual analysis of either the Indian Commerce Clause or plenary power,
instead lumping it in with the rest of Congress’s Article I powers.233
224. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
225. Id. at 75.
226. Id. at 83.
227. Id. at 84.
228. Id. at 85 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555).
229. Id. at 86–87, 89.
230. 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
231. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555.
232. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 72–73 (“The Eleventh Amendment restricts
the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”).
233. Id. This is especially odd given that less than ten years later, the Court would find at
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III. Justice Thomas’s Critique
In more recent years, the swinging of the federal Indian policy pendulum
towards a policy that favors tribal sovereignty—rather than one that seeks
to diminish it through the hammer of plenary power—has exacerbated the
theoretical tension between the two concepts. Congress’s reliance on certain
principles of tribal sovereignty as it sought the complete destruction of
tribal governments raised constitutional concerns never seriously addressed
by the Court. Similarly, recent action relying on ethereal power to restore
prior functions of tribal sovereignty has created concerns about both the
source and scope of the underlying power and the sincerity of Congress’s
adherence to its claimed principles. In the modern context, however, Justice
Clarence Thomas has initiated a full critique of the doctrine, recognizing
the time has come to reconsider the foundations of congressional authority
to alter the character of tribes recognized as sovereign by our government.
A. Treaty Clause
While Justice Thomas focuses most of his critique on the Court’s
reliance on the Indian Commerce Clause, he does address the doubtful
notion that the power might derive from the Treaty Clause. In Lara, Justice
Thomas focuses his critique of the majority’s plenary power logic with its
Treaty Clause justification.234 He notes the Lara majority’s own
acknowledgement “that ‘[t]he treaty power does not literally authorize
Congress to act legislatively, for it is an Article II power.’”235 Justice
Thomas emphasizes the fact that the treaty power is a creature of Article II,
not Article I, and so vests authority in the President “to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur[.]”236 However, to
Congress, “it provides no power . . . at least in the absence of a specific
treaty.”237
While Justice Thomas acknowledges that, at times, congressional
assertions of power might be reinforced by historical circumstances and
effective concession by other branches, he contends that the history of

least some of the federal government’s Indian plenary power comes from the Treaty Clause,
plainly a creature of Article II and not Article I. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201
(2004).
234. Lara, 541 U.S. at 225 (Thomas, J., concurring).
235. Id. (quoting majority opinion, 541 U.S. at 201).
236. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
237. Lara, 541 U.S. at 225 (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)).
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federal Indian law does not provide such a clear picture.238 The history, he
contends, is fundamentally at odds with itself because “[t]he Federal
Government cannot simultaneously claim power to regulate virtually every
aspect of the tribes through ordinary domestic legislation and also maintain
that the tribes possess anything resembling ‘sovereignty.’”239 He concludes
by chastising the Court for finding that the treaty power gives Congress a
“free-floating power to legislate as it sees fit on topics that could potentially
implicate some unspecified treaty.”240
B. Indian Commerce Clause
Since his concurrence in Lara, Justice Thomas has continued developing
his critique of the modern dual-sovereignty regime, focusing on the plenary
power doctrine and its “shak[y] foundations.”241 In Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, Justice Thomas’s concurrence addressed in depth the argument
that the Indian Commerce Clause “provides Congress with ‘plenary power
over Indian affairs.’”242 Thomas began by noting that the Indian Commerce
Clause, itself merely a sub-clause of the larger Commerce Clause, draws its
meaning from the same “[c]ommerce”243 as the larger one. This
construction stands unless the Framers specifically intended that word to
have a different meaning when applied to Indian tribes.244 He follows by
noting that the phrase “commerce with Indian tribes” was, at the founding,
synonymous with the phrase “trade with the Indians.”245 Therefore, at very
least, Congress has no more power to regulate Indians through the Indian
Commerce Clause than it has to regulate through the general Commerce
Clause.246
Justice Thomas identifies “an additional textual limitation”: that the
Indian Commerce Clause grants Congress only “the power to regulate
Commerce ‘with the Indian tribes.’”247 When relying on the Indian
238. Id. (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1968 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).
242. 570 U.S. 637, 658 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1901(1)
(2012)).
243. Id. at 659 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J.
concurring)).
244. Id. at 659–60.
245. Id. at 659 (internal quotations omitted).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 660 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
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Commerce Clause, Congress may only regulate commerce with tribes as
tribes.248 The Clause does not contain language that would authorize
congressional regulation of individual tribal members’ commercial
conduct.249 This is especially relevant in the context of the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA).250 ICWA was passed largely as a remedial statute in
response to “abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation
of large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through
adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.”251 In order
to combat this wide-reaching problem, Congress elected to apply several
provisions of ICWA to “all child custody proceedings involving an Indian
child, regardless of whether an Indian tribe is involved.”252 Often then, the
unit of application is not tribes, specifically within Congress’s grant under
the Indian Commerce Clause, but rather individual Indian children.253 This
includes Indian children who are United States citizens and residents of
states far removed from tribal jurisdiction.254 It even covers Indian children
without tribal members as parents.255
Recently, Justice Thomas applied his originalist formulation of the
Indian Commerce Clause to the IRA’s land-into-trust provisions. In Upstate
Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. United States, Justice Thomas dissented256
from the Court’s decision to deny a petition for a Writ of Certiorari. The
appeal arose from the Second Circuit’s decision to allow the federal
government to take into trust between 13,000 and 17,000 acres in upstate
New York for the benefit of the Oneida Nation.257 In Justice Thomas’s
view, the act of taking land into trust for an Indian tribe is not “commerce”
within the meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause.258 Even then, assuming
that it could be considered commerce, often enough the IRA is applied in
ways that “do not involve trade of any kind,” as “[t]he IRA permits the
Secretary to take into trust land that an Indian tribe already owns.”259

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 665.
Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989).
Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 665 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
199 L. Ed. 2d 372, 372 (2017).
Upstate Citizens for Equal. v. United States, 841 F.3d 556, 564 (2d Cir. 2016).
Upstate Citizens, 199 L. Ed. 2d at 373.
Id.
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As the process itself allows land taken into trust to be considered federal
land for the purpose of state taxation and regulation, the land-into-trust
provisions effectively allow the federal government to take swathes of land
from states and “strip the State of almost all sovereign power over it.”260
Taking the argument to its logical extreme, Justice Thomas argues that this
view of plenary power gives Congress the ability to “reduce a State to near
nonexistence by taking all land within its borders and declaring it sovereign
Indian territory.”261
C. Alternative View
Justice Thomas’s approach to the Indian Commerce Clause is not
without critiques. Professor Gregory Ablavsky has argued that Justice
Thomas’s clause-by-clause approach to Congress’s power over Indian
affairs misses the point.262 Ablavsky argues that the constitutional powers
over Indian affairs emanate not only from the Indian Commerce and Treaty
Clauses, but also from “the Supremacy Clause, the Guarantee Clause,
Article III jurisdiction, restrictions on the states, and military powers.”263
The interplay between these clauses was intended. The text of the
Supremacy Clause serves as a barrier to state interference not only in
matters of pure commerce, but also makes treaties, the primary means of
dealing with Indian relations at the time, the supreme law of the land.264
These treaties are then provided an enforcement mechanism through the
judicial branch’s Article III jurisdiction.265 Likewise, the convention
dropped the word “foreign” from the Guarantee Clause’s mandate that the
“United States . . . shall protect each [state] against Invasion.”266
This framework, Ablavsky argues, created an environment of effective
field preemption in the early republic.267 Conceptualizing Congress’s Indian
power in this manner, rather than using a clause-based approach, “makes

260. Id. at 374.
261. Id.
262. Ablavsky, supra note 34, at 1040–41.
263. Id. at 1041.
264. Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1055 (2014).
265. Id. at 1043–44.
266. Id. at 1047 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4).
267. Ablavsky, supra note 34, at 1040; see Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398–
400 (2012) (discussing the concept of federal preemption of state laws where the federal
government’s policy is “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for States to supplement
[additional laws]” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))
(alteration in original)).
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the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 more intelligible.”268 The Act
and its subsequent amendments “codified a hodgepodge of federal powers,
some intended to protect the federal treaty power, others related to trade.”269
Attempting to discover a single constitutional source authorizing the Act,
according to Ablavsky, “asks the wrong question.”270 Instead, he argues that
the Act is simply the federal government flexing its muscles, demonstrating
that it has all the marbles when it comes to Indian affairs.271 Through the
Constitution and the Trade and Intercourse Act, Ablavsky contends that
Congress reserved essentially every contemporaneously salient aspect of
Indian policy for itself, a result “roughly analogous to present-day concepts
of field preemption.”272 As such, more nationalistic federalists argued that
the Constitution “prohibited the exercise of state authority” in Indian
affairs.273
The broad-reaching implications of Ablavsky’s theory do not stop there.
Acknowledging that the conclusions of the nationalistic factions were not
universally held, he argues that even the state-oriented anti-federalist
opposition based its arguments on the structure of the Constitution, not on
the Indian Commerce Clause or any other clause alone.274 Ablavsky uses
the example of Georgia Congressman James Jackson’s opposition to a
provision of the 1790 Treaty of New York, which guaranteed the Creek
Nation title to land in Georgia.275 Jackson cited “the plainest principles of
the Constitution, particularly those parts which secured to every citizen the
rights of property,” as well as Article IV’s promise that “nothing in the
Constitution would prejudice state territorial claims.”276
Others relied on more abstract principles of state sovereignty that they
believed were retained under the Constitution.277 The legislature of Georgia

268. Ablavsky, supra note 34, at 1043 (“[T]he [Act] established a licensing scheme for
Indian traders, barred treaty-making with tribes without federal approval, and extended state
laws over whites traveling into Indian country.”).
269. Id. at 1044.
270. Id. at 1043–44.
271. Id. at 1044.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1045.
275. Id. at 1046.
276. Id. (quoting 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1793 (1790)).
277. Id. at 1047 (“Georgian representatives even denounced licenses required to attend
federal treaty negotiations with Natives, declaring, ‘We know of no power on earth,
competent to hinder a citizen of Georgia . . . from exercising the locomotive faculty, within
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itself, Ablavsky notes, justified selling the federally guaranteed land to land
companies on its “full exercise of the jurisdiction and territorial right . . . of
disposing thereof.”278 This right is apparently derived from the Treaty of
Paris (evidently adopted by the Constitution), the Ex Post Facto Clause, and
the Constitution’s guarantee of state territory.279 Ablavsky concludes by
acknowledging that this more abstract practice of reading a general power
from narrower, more specific grants, gave way fairly early on to the more
clause-based approach. By the 1830s, aggressive state sovereignty
advocates relied on narrow interpretations of the Indian Commerce Clause
to support assertions of sovereignty over Indian nations.280
D. Collision Course Between Inherent Tribal Sovereignty and Plenary
Power
Unlike other areas of Indian law, which focus primarily on statutes and
treaties as applied or relevant to either individual or specifically enumerated
tribes,281 the theories of inherent sovereignty and plenary power result in
laws and precedent that apply broadly to Indian tribes as a class.282 Plenary
power treats the federal government’s authority over tribes as uniform,
regardless of the tribe and that tribe’s relationship with the United States.
Inherent sovereignty, meanwhile, assumes that every tribe has given up
precisely the same amount of its sovereignty in order to exist within the
United States, without reference to its individual treaties or relationship
with the United States.283
Providing the federal government with such broad power to define what
sovereignty means for every tribal government stretches the term “inherent”
the limits of the State, in the most liberal extent.’” (quoting Letter from James Hendricks to
the Comm’rs of the United States (May 31, 1796)).
278. Id. (quoting Act of Jan. 7, 1795, 1795 Ga. Laws 3, § 1.)
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1049.
281. See generally Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) (diminishment and
disestablishment of reservations); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993)
(abrogation of treaty rights); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980)
(looking to federal interests as applied to regulation of timber within specific tribe’s
reservation).
282. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 209–10 (2004) (holding that Congress’s
plenary power could restore inherent power to criminally punish non-member Indians).
283. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211–12 (1978) (holding that
Indian tribes generally lacked inherent power to criminally punish non-Indians); Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697–98 (1990) (holding that Indian tribes generally lacked inherent
power to criminally punish non-member Indians).
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to its limits. At some point, the tribe is no longer exercising its own
sovereignty but instead what limited sovereignty the federal government
deigns to allow. Likewise, true recognition of the sovereignty of any nation
implies that dealings with it are maintained through the consent of the
nation and the recognition that its internal affairs are its business. The
plenary power doctrine does not respect tribal sovereignty and has sought
its effective destruction since its advent.
IV. Analysis
Sovereignty is and always has been a fluid concept and matters of
sovereignty are best resolved by negotiations and agreements between the
two sovereigns. These agreements can be altered as needed by the parties,
not by micromanagement through plenary power or by resort to the courts
for a final answer that produces a winner and a loser. The contradictions
intrinsic in the dueling concepts of inherent tribal sovereignty and
congressional plenary power will eventually resolve themselves, one way or
another. The federal government has wielded plenary power in a way that
can often be described as arbitrary and heavy-handed. Some have been
tempted,284 for the sake of legal sanity, to attack title 25 in its entirety and
seek to start from scratch. However, any sincere reconciliation of federal
Indian policy with its constitutional limitations cannot do away with title 25
in one fell swoop.
To that end, two results present themselves. The first, heavily implied by
Justice Thomas, is largely mechanical. This approach begins from the
premise that the plenary power doctrine is a power grab, not only from
tribal governments, but also from state and local governments.285 The Act
of 1871, although likely unenforceable as a restraint on the ability of the
executive to negotiate and sign treaties,286 is dispositive insofar as it
declares the opinion of Congress that tribes no longer possess an
independent sovereignty. From here, the structure of our constitutional
government dictates the terms. To the extent that tribes are dealt with as
tribes, the federal government retains primary, although non-exclusive,
jurisdiction over matters of “commerce.” State governments, as recognized
sovereigns under the Constitution, will have concurrent jurisdiction over the
284. See, e.g., Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 536 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (holding
ICWA unconstitutional as a racial classification that failed to survive strict scrutiny).
285. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218–25 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
286. Id. at 218 (noting that “the Constitution vests in the President both the power to
make treaties and to recognize foreign governments”) (citation omitted).
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regulation of tribes as tribes, should they choose to regulate in that fashion,
and exclusive jurisdiction over individual tribal members. In this scenario,
tribes will necessarily cease to be a constitutionally relevant entity. Tribes
will be indistinguishable from private groups or businesses for the purposes
of their ability to regulate their members or those doing business with them.
This is not, however, the only possible outcome. This alternative
outcome recognizes that the end of plenary power would necessarily mean
the rethinking of much of title 25, but it does not have to leave a vacuum.
Depending on how Congress chooses to react, either tribal governments or
state governments will pick up the slack. If Congress elects to recognize
tribes as nations (requiring repeal of the Act of 1871’s prohibitions on
treatymaking, even if the Act is likely unconstitutional), then it must
disclaim all power over the internal affairs of tribes, essentially recognizing
their total sovereignty. Congress can retain the status quo vis-a-vis treaties
negotiated with individual tribes.
Except to the extent that Congress may regulate commerce with tribes,
Indian tribes are afforded no special or lesser status within the
Constitution’s text.287 There is no special grant of power to either the states
or federal government that would authorize any governmental action
beyond what is necessary and proper to regulate commerce with the
tribes.288 Under the Constitution, the federal government is wholly without
the subject matter authority recognized in Kagama and Lone Wolf. In the
absence of explicit authorization, the Constitution provides only two ways
for the federal government to extend its subject matter grant: 1) passage of
a constitutional amendment, or 2) ratification of a treaty, so long as neither
the treaty nor any implementing legislation violates explicit constitutional
prohibitions on the exercise of federal power.289
As none of the twenty-seven amendments to the Constitution extend
such authority, and Ablavsky himself recognizes that the penumbra
approach to Congress’s enumerated powers fell out of vogue very early in
the Republic,290 the only remaining sources are treaties negotiated by the
executive and ratified by two-thirds of the Senate.291 The metes and bounds
of tribal sovereignty and relations with the United States, for each tribe so
recognized by the federal government, are then defined not by unilateral
and unsupported congressional action, but by mutual agreement between
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Id.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
Ablavsky, supra note 34, at 1049.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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truly separate sovereigns, ratified by two-thirds of the states’
representatives.292 If this seems strange, it shouldn’t. After all, prior to
1871, all dealings with Indian tribes were conducted by treaty. It was only
after an act of Congress purported to remove from the executive branch the
ability to make treaties with Indian tribes that this practice ceased; even
then, the practice continued at least in form until Kagama and Lone Wolf.
While the effects of the Act inform the facts that have developed since
1871, the blatantly unconstitutional law can have no continuing force on
executive action, if it ever had any at all.
The consideration of tribal sovereignty and congressional authority to
regulate tribes on an individual basis is not impracticable.293 Treaty rights
and reservation boundaries are already litigated on a tribe-by-tribe basis.294
While perhaps less of a perfect fit for judicial disposition than treaty rights
or reservation boundaries, the Court already provides a framework, used
elsewhere in federal Indian law, that could easily be applied here.
When the Court reviews claims that Congress has diminished or
disestablished the borders of a reservation, it follows the well-established
framework from Solem v. Bartlett.295 First, this test looks to see if the text
of any congressional act or treaty contains words or phrases that would
clearly indicate that the act or treaty intended to diminish or disestablish the
borders of a reservation.296 If the text provides no such indication, as is
often the case because the Court did not establish what it considered to be
the proper magic words until decades later, then the Court looks to the
justifiable expectations of both parties.297 Unless both parties (especially the
Indian negotiating team) clearly expected that the particular act would
diminish or disestablish the reservation, and not that it was part of a series

292. Id.
293. Nor is the idea of measuring federal plenary power on a tribe-by-tribe basis in the
modern context new. Professor Saikrishna Prakash has argued that federal plenary power, to
the extent that any can exist over Indian tribes, must be determined on a tribe-by-tribe basis
and that many existing treaties recognize such power. See Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal
Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1110–12 (2004). Justice Thomas even cites Professor
Prakash’s arguments, if only in passing, in his concurrence in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
570 U.S. 637, 664 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).
294. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508
U.S. 679 (1993).
295. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470–72.
296. Id. at 470.
297. Id. at 471.
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that would eventually have that effect, then no diminishment or
disestablishment occurred.298
Finally, if there is conflicting evidence with at least some evidence
pointing towards diminishment or disestablishment, then the Court may
look to the demographic history of the reservation immediately following
the act.299 While this step is never enough on its own to prove
disestablishment, it can confirm what evidence from the first two steps
might suggest.300 The Court considers this step to be “unorthodox” in the
context of reservation boundaries. The Court applies the step only rarely, as
diminishment or disestablishment is a purely legal matter.301 Boundaries
cannot simply vanish by means of adverse possession or the passage of
time.302
Applying this framework to determine which elements of sovereignty
have been ceded or what authority was granted to the federal government
over time is fairly straightforward. First, courts could look to treaties signed
by the tribes and subsequent acts of Congress based upon the relevant
treaty. Courts determine whether any power inherent as a matter of
sovereignty had been ceded or whether there was an explicit grant of
authority to the United States. This step might look to questions of how the
individual tribe exercised its sovereignty historically, before the Columbian
encounter, where evidence is available. Where evidence is less available (as
will often be the case), courts might look to the continuity of government.
Courts may set a bright-line rule that if the tribal government was
completely dissolved at any time in the last 150 years, then it is presumed
to have lost most, if not all, of its inherent sovereignty. The burden would
shift to the defendant or tribe to prove that Congress had given that aspect
of sovereignty back to the tribe.
The second step would look to the expectations of parties negotiating
any act or treaty and if they believed that the passage of any act would
result in the elimination of an aspect of inherent sovereignty. Historical
evidence, while possibly sparse, can help elucidate both how individual
tribes historically exercised sovereignty and how they altered it vis-a-vis
their relationship with the United States. As with the diminishment and
298. Id.
299. Id. at 471–72.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 472 n.13; see also Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1081–82 (2016)
(holding that a tribe’s 120-year absence did not assign the Court the “role to ‘rewrite’ the
1882 Act in light of this subsequent demographic history”).
302. Solem, 465 U.S. at 472 n.13.
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disestablishment test, the critical factor in this step is whether the tribal
negotiator firmly believed that a specific act of Congress would eliminate a
particular aspect of tribal sovereignty.303
The third step for this test would be more expansive than the third step in
Solem. As sovereignty is a more fluid concept than legal borders, courts
would look to whether, after the passage of a certain act, either a federal or
state official began to assume a traditional tribal responsibility. The tribe
must have either consented or relented to the result. Caution is urged in this
step, but this is also the proper place to examine whether an aspect of tribal
sovereignty, surrendered either under step one or step two, had ever been
restored by a subsequent action of Congress. Behavior by tribal, state, or
federal government following ambiguous legislation can be indicative of
the parties’ expectations. If there is a function of government inherent in
sovereignty that evidence shows the tribe continued to perform without
objection from either federal or state officials, it can serve as confirmation
that an aspect of tribal sovereignty has not been surrendered.
V. Conclusion
The Constitution has, since its framing, promised a government of
enumerated powers. It removed from the regular order of government the
means to alter its original grant, requiring supermajorities of Congress and
sometimes the states to so act. The republic, likewise, has included distinct
sovereigns within its borders in the form of states and Indian tribes. This is
accounted for in the framing, providing the extraordinary measure of
amending the Constitution to regulate the affairs of the states and the
extraordinary measure of a treaty to regulate the behavior of tribes.
If there are truly extraordinary situations that require an inference of
federal power from words not present in the Constitution’s text, plenary
power over Indian affairs is not the case. The plenary power doctrine has
been extra-constitutional since its beginning. It serves as a stark reminder of
a time where the Court readily altered the scope of Congress’s
constitutional authority to meet the demands of the day. The doctrine has
been based upon paternalistic and racist assumptions that Indian tribes are
incapable of governing themselves, or if they are to govern themselves,
they must assimilate completely and abandon all aspects of their culture and
heritage. That the power has been utilized in ways beneficial to tribes does
not save it. Federal Indian policy has almost always been shaped, at least in
part, by those who earnestly believed that they were acting in the best
303. Id. at 470–72.
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interests of the tribe. The policymakers behind allotment believed that
ending tribal government and forcing the issue of individual lands would be
beneficial for tribes.
The end of plenary power does not and should not mean the end of tribal
sovereignty or the federal government’s role in recognizing and managing
relations with tribes. Congress should, nevertheless, follow the structure
provided by the Constitution in doing so. Commerce with Indian tribes is
properly regulated by Congress, but tribes, as individual sovereigns distinct
from the national and state governments, should be recognized by and dealt
with on a tribe-by-tribe basis. Binding agreements between tribes and the
United States should be ratified by a supermajority of United States
Senators. This was the state of affairs for nearly the first hundred years of
the republic’s existence, during times where the tribal-federal relationship
was anything but friendly. This is not a simple process, but the fact that the
Constitution makes the creation of national policy more difficult is no
excuse to invent new federal powers based upon foundations of sand.
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